The Hard Hand of War, Chapters 7-9

Burning of Atlanta

The policy of the United States toward the Confederate States of America during the Civil War moved from one of conciliation to pragmatism to hard war.  Conciliation made sense at the beginning of the war, but had to be abandoned.  Up to a certain point, it had worked.  The message of conciliation was not being understood clearly by the Confederates, partially due to certain contradictions, which caused the strategy to have to be abandoned.  Mark Grimsley, author of The Hard Hand of War, argues that "it is unlikely that the Southern people ever really understood the message of forbearance that Lincoln and other Northern moderates were trying to communicate" (Grimsley 211).  The war had already been destructive, but generally prior to the introduction of this new policy, war was not waged against civilians.  The Emancipation Proclamation officially brought about the hard war policy and Grant's ascension to command firmly established it.  The year 1863 marked the turning point in policy and the start of destruction at a wider scale.

Hard war had already been flirted with by other generals of the United States.  Grimsley claims that this was not hard war, but "a rigorous application of the pragmatic policy" (Grimsley 143).  Destruction of private property was usually in response to guerrilla warfare.  Other times it was pure vandalism, like the burning of private residences for no reason.  In Jackson, Mississippi, Major Thomas T. Taylor wrote that "the army acted more as a mob, than as disciplined soldiers" (Grimsley 161).  Destruction of railroads was considered legitimate by both sides.

Although hard war became the general policy by 1863, the severity varied from general to general.  Some generals carried out the policy indiscriminately.  Others disliked the hard war policy entirely.  Major General Henry W. Halleck was in favor in dealing with the South more harshly.  General Order No. 100 asserted "Sharp wars are brief" (Grimsley 149).  General William Tecumseh Sherman was never completely comfortable with the hard war policy.  Grimsley contends that "[i]t bothered him that soldiers would not confine themselves simply to authorized destruction" (Grimsley 193).

Most generals agreed that the hard war policy should be used with "appropriate discrimination" (Grimsley 180).  For the most part, property of those who supported the Confederacy was all that was targeted.  Few generals allowed for "wanton devastation" (Grimsley 150).  Sherman stated regarding the evacuation of Atlanta: "We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your lands, or anything you have, but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States.  That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it" (Grimsley 188).  Generals understood that anything that made peace more difficult after the war was over would be counterproductive and wrong.  Sherman asserted during the Savannah Campaign that commanders should "order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility" (Grimsley 175).

War-related factories and mills were often among the buildings destroyed.  Buildings that could be used in any way in the war effort were also often burned.  Not only did Union soldiers use Confederate crops and livestock to survive, they would destroy what they could not use in an attempt to cripple the Confederate army, guerrillas, and supporters.  Sherman reported on July 14, 1863, to Grant: "We are absolutely stripping the country of corn, hogs, sheep, poultry, everything, and the new-growing corn is being thrown open as pasture fields or hauled for the use of our animals" (Grimsley 159).  This devastation was practical, but also psychological, attempting a blow to the Confederate civilians and soldiers morale.

Soldiers were not allowed to enter private homes without permission or destroy anything that was not considered military necessity.  Theft was also greatly frowned upon.  General David Hunter witnessed soldiers breaking into homes and taking "dresses, ornaments, books, [and] money" (Grimsley 178).  He was furious at this scene.  Union soldiers became conditioned to the level of destruction with Grant in Mississippi.  It was hard enough to keep soldiers from vandalizing and stealing prior to the introduction of hard war policy.  It became more difficult after destruction and foraging were a normal part of their duties.

Some soldiers agreed wholeheartedly with the hard war policy.  Even so, they believed only those who deserved it should be affected and "only in rough proportion to the extent of their sins" (Grimsley 185).  Others felt disturbed by it.  One soldier wrote home to his wife saying that while the strategy was effective at weakening the enemy, he could not "but feel a kind of a sense of injustice connected with it" (Grimsley 158).  Some soldiers believed it turned Southern civilians into enemies.

Grant aimed for a two-pronged strategy - one of annihilating Lee's army, the other, destruction of the Southern resources.  Grant saw the destruction as nothing more than a military necessity, albeit an unfortunate one.  According to Grimsley: "Grant, although willing to inflict destruction on a large scale if necessary to defeat the enemy, was far from embracing a policy of indiscriminate devastation" (Grimsley 162).

According to Grimsley, hard war was key in defeating the Confederacy:

"By destroying railroads they had crippled the South's ability to transfer men and supplies from one theater to another.  By eliminating arsenals, foundries, lead mines, and other factories they had ended the South's ability to create the sinews of war.  And by taking livestock and burning or despoiling they had done great temporary harm to the South's ability to feed itself" (Grimsley 203).

He asserts that more important than all of this was the blows dealt to Southern morale.  They no longer had confidence they could keep up the fight and win their independence.  Grimsley argues that even after years of warfare, most soldiers "still maintained a basic morality" (Grimsley 185) which differs from wars in history that are considered "total wars."  This morality did not stop destruction, but "it channeled it in some directions and away from others" (Grimsley 185).  Hard war damaged much Southern property, but restraint was also exercised.

Turned Inside Out: Reflection on Wilkeson

In the Introduction to Turned Inside Out: Recollections of a Private Soldier in the Army of the Potomac, James M. McPherson argues that "[t]he Civil War was the biggest and most fearful experience that any generation of Americans has known" (Wilkeson v) and that it changed society permanantly in both the North and the South.  The Civil War stole the lives of more than 620,000 soldiers.  He applauds Frank Wilkeson's memoir as one of the first and most accurate recorded by a private soldier.  Wilkeson focused on the reality of the war, with its good and bad moments, and for the most part chose not to exaggerate in his descriptions of either.  McPherson remarks that Wilkeson sometimes "leans too far to the dark and ugly side, producing distortions of his own" (Wilkeson viii), but his memoir if by far one of the most reliable.

In 1863, Wilkeson joined the army at fifteen years old.  He was one of the few to serve as a volunteer in the last two years of the war.  He served for seven weeks with the Army of the Potomac in a period of time with some of the most intense fighting of the war.  Wilkeson wrote his memoir for the purpose of describing the Civil War from the perspective of a private soldier.  The literary works about the war were largely written by generals before his.  In Wilkeson's opinion, these generals had reputations to repair and therefore their writings cannot fully be trusted.  He believed enlisted men could provide the most accurate descriptions of the war and encouraged others to write their own memoirs.

When Wilkeson enlisted, he was surprised at the way he was received.  Those in command treated him like he was a criminal.  This was largely because of the epidemic of bounty-jumpers that plagued the army in the last two years of the war.  Wilkeson looked down on these men calling them "murderers and thieves" (Wilkeson 3).  He mentions other cowards he comes across, including a man who shot his own foot to get out of fighting.  The surgeons were much less sympathetic to this wounded man then others who had truly been wounded in battle.  The young man unfortunately woke up from surgery and "found that his leg was off" (Wilkeson 150), which was certainly an unintended consequence to his cowardice.

Life as a soldier was often rewarding for Wilkeson but wrought with hardships.  Traveling initially to the front, Wilkeson remarked on the disorganization and chaos.  Men gambled, got drunk, and stole from other men.  At the start of the campaign, Wilkeson recalled advice he received from a more seasoned soldier.  The soldier told him to pack light, focusing on food and tobacco.  When they were marching, he was only to pick up extra food or tobacco, not clothing or blankets.  He also advised him to fill his canteen whenever possible and not to straggle.  The Union soldiers often did not get enough sleep and were hungry much of the time.  Wilkeson remembered "the lack of good food and loss of sleep told hard on me" (Wilkeson 147).  After the fighting, the men were reminded that this war was not an adventure or fun, but it was "a savage encounter with desperate adversaries, who dealt death and grievous wounds with impartial hands" (Wilkeson 86).  The fighting physically weakened them and "unstrung our nerves" (Wilkeson 97).  Dead soldiers were usually left on the battlefield and buried quickly after the fighting was over.

The title of the book references the pockets of the dead soldiers lying on the battlefield.  Their pockets were turned inside out as the living stole what was in the dead mens pockets along with their bags.  Wilkeson recalled: "The dead men lay where they fell.  Their haversacks and cartridges had been taken from their bodies.  The battle-field ghouls had rifled their pockets.  I saw no dead man that night whose pockets had not been turned inside out" (Wilkeson 67).  Wilkeson admitted to doing this himself at times as well as stealing from the living.  He confessed that once before going back into battle "I equipped myself with a plug of tobacco and two canteens filled with water - never mind where I got them" (Wilkeson 69).  Wilkeson acknowledged that he stole tobacco, haversacks, and at one point a "sheep, which I had met in a field near Bowling Green" (Wilkeson 142).  Wilkeson remembered that the troops, himself included, raided tobacco barns, killed sheep and chickens, and stole food from farmhouses.

The men seemed to be high in spirits when something worthwhile was coming up, like marching to a new location or a flank movement.  Monotony, drills, and endless fighting seemed to discourage them.  Wilkeson remembered "joyfully" packing up "[a]t once understanding that a flank movement was at hand" (Wilkeson 151).  When marching to The Battle of the Wilderness, Wilkeson remarked that there was "the sound of exultant cheering" (Wilkeson 43).  Wilkeson himself was eager to fight.  In the Battle of the Wilderness, his was the reserve artillery, but he was anxious to see the battle.  He goes to check it out, knowing how dangerous it is.  Eventually, he picks up a musket and starts fighting as if he were an infantryman.

Wilkeson was surprised how quickly news travelled through the army.  He recalled that men would wander around the camps at night, going from fire to fire, bringing and looking for news.  Wilkeson called them the "army news-gatherers" (Wilkeson 54).  Rumors spread wildly and were often correct.  Wilkeson mentioned hearing one rumor repeated over fifty times one night that Meade had advised Grant to retreat after the Battle of the Wilderness.  He also recalled hearing an exciting rumor that enemy plans and numbers were found in the coat of a dead Confederate soldier.  Most of the information the soldiers received was from "prisoners whom they captured, from fellow-soldiers serving in the calvary, from negroes, and above all from the 'news-gatherers' who walked the battle-lines in the night" (Wilkeson 108)

The soldiers also like to study maps, strategize, and guess what the next move was and whether it would be successful.  Wilkeson argued that the enlisted men were skilled and accurate in their military reasoning and they could usually accurately judge the state of the campaigns.  One night the men sat up for hours studying maps "earnestly endeavoring to fathom Grant's plans" (Wilkeson 100).

Grant's leadership was for the most part welcomed by the Army of the Potomac because the men believed he would be more aggressive than his predecessors.  Wilkeson remembered hearing one man assert that Grant "cannot be weaker or more inefficient than the generals who have wasted the lives of our comrades during the past three years" (Wilkeson 37).  When Grant came in command of the Army of the Potomac, the men were ready to be led to victory or defeat and most just wanted the war to end.  Grant brought more recruits and firmer regulation and discipline.  When the campaign began, men were high in spirits and ready to go.  The Army of the Potomac had "longed for a fighting general - one who would fight, and fight, and fight" (Wilkeson 88), and with Grant, they got one.

Wilkeson seemed to have animosity toward many of the generals.  He believed they were lazy and did not fight with their troops like they should.  He sometimes doubted their ability to accurately judge the state of a battle or campaign.  He mentioned being worried at times "that Grant would keep sending us to the slaughter" (Wilkeson 123).  He criticized the generals for procrastinating on flank movements.  He denounced Generals Winfield Scott Hancock and William F. Smith for "dawdling the night away" (Wilkeson 172) when sensitive information regarding Confederate positions had been found.  He also criticized the amount of Union generals who lost their lives, arguing if they were doing their jobs correctly more would have been lost.  Wilkeson explained "[w]e knew the fighting generals and we respected them, and we knew the cowards and despised them" (Wilkeson 185).  The lack of fighting on the part of the generals, Wilkeson argued, was one of the biggest demoralizers of the Army of the Potomac.

Wilkeson often noted the poverty he saw among the Confederate soldiers and that it was especially evident "by the clothing and equipment of her dead" (Wilkeson 125).  He was impressed that despite their poverty, they fought "like men of purely American blood"(Wilkeson 70).  This shows that while Wilkeson fought for the purpose of reunification, he admired the Confederate soldiers and still considered them brothers.  He described them as skilled fighters who could be "deadly accurate" (Wilkeson 71).  Wilkeson never expressed in his writings bitterness or hatred for the Confederacy or its citizens.  He often applauded their courage and competence.

Despite the animosity between the North and the South, Wilkeson described moments of kindness between the two sides.  Wounded men would help other wounded men, despite their allegiance, to safely.  Wilkeson illustrated a touching scene where two soldiers, one Union and the other Confederate, were "drinking in turn out of a Union canteen, as they lay behind a tree" (Wilkeson 73).  He also recalled honorable Confederate soldiers who in one instance "understood what was being done and ceased to shoot" (Wilkeson 138) when a Union soldier ran into the line of fire to rescue another wounded soldier.  Wilkeson described "an unwritten code of honor among the infantry that forbade the shooting of men while attending to the imperative calls of nature" (Wilkeson 121).  Wilkeson himself once shared food with lost Confederate soldiers in the woods.  These exceptions show the humanity soldiers still have when they are fighting one another.

Wilkeson argued that the Union made two large mistakes during the Civil War.  The first was calling for volunteers to fight.  He believed that a draft should have happened sooner.  That way, the end of the war would not have been so wrought with bounty-jumpers and cowards.  The second mistake he saw was in the appointment of generals.  He argued that appointing mainly West Point graduates was a mistake because they were never soldiers themselves and were not fit to command soldiers.  He further goes on to say that West Point should be shut down.  He placed the blame for the war being drawn out as long as it was firmly on the shoulders of those West Point generals.