The Hard Hand of War, Chapters 7-9

Burning of Atlanta

The policy of the United States toward the Confederate States of America during the Civil War moved from one of conciliation to pragmatism to hard war.  Conciliation made sense at the beginning of the war, but had to be abandoned.  Up to a certain point, it had worked.  The message of conciliation was not being understood clearly by the Confederates, partially due to certain contradictions, which caused the strategy to have to be abandoned.  Mark Grimsley, author of The Hard Hand of War, argues that "it is unlikely that the Southern people ever really understood the message of forbearance that Lincoln and other Northern moderates were trying to communicate" (Grimsley 211).  The war had already been destructive, but generally prior to the introduction of this new policy, war was not waged against civilians.  The Emancipation Proclamation officially brought about the hard war policy and Grant's ascension to command firmly established it.  The year 1863 marked the turning point in policy and the start of destruction at a wider scale.

Hard war had already been flirted with by other generals of the United States.  Grimsley claims that this was not hard war, but "a rigorous application of the pragmatic policy" (Grimsley 143).  Destruction of private property was usually in response to guerrilla warfare.  Other times it was pure vandalism, like the burning of private residences for no reason.  In Jackson, Mississippi, Major Thomas T. Taylor wrote that "the army acted more as a mob, than as disciplined soldiers" (Grimsley 161).  Destruction of railroads was considered legitimate by both sides.

Although hard war became the general policy by 1863, the severity varied from general to general.  Some generals carried out the policy indiscriminately.  Others disliked the hard war policy entirely.  Major General Henry W. Halleck was in favor in dealing with the South more harshly.  General Order No. 100 asserted "Sharp wars are brief" (Grimsley 149).  General William Tecumseh Sherman was never completely comfortable with the hard war policy.  Grimsley contends that "[i]t bothered him that soldiers would not confine themselves simply to authorized destruction" (Grimsley 193).

Most generals agreed that the hard war policy should be used with "appropriate discrimination" (Grimsley 180).  For the most part, property of those who supported the Confederacy was all that was targeted.  Few generals allowed for "wanton devastation" (Grimsley 150).  Sherman stated regarding the evacuation of Atlanta: "We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your lands, or anything you have, but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States.  That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it" (Grimsley 188).  Generals understood that anything that made peace more difficult after the war was over would be counterproductive and wrong.  Sherman asserted during the Savannah Campaign that commanders should "order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility" (Grimsley 175).

War-related factories and mills were often among the buildings destroyed.  Buildings that could be used in any way in the war effort were also often burned.  Not only did Union soldiers use Confederate crops and livestock to survive, they would destroy what they could not use in an attempt to cripple the Confederate army, guerrillas, and supporters.  Sherman reported on July 14, 1863, to Grant: "We are absolutely stripping the country of corn, hogs, sheep, poultry, everything, and the new-growing corn is being thrown open as pasture fields or hauled for the use of our animals" (Grimsley 159).  This devastation was practical, but also psychological, attempting a blow to the Confederate civilians and soldiers morale.

Soldiers were not allowed to enter private homes without permission or destroy anything that was not considered military necessity.  Theft was also greatly frowned upon.  General David Hunter witnessed soldiers breaking into homes and taking "dresses, ornaments, books, [and] money" (Grimsley 178).  He was furious at this scene.  Union soldiers became conditioned to the level of destruction with Grant in Mississippi.  It was hard enough to keep soldiers from vandalizing and stealing prior to the introduction of hard war policy.  It became more difficult after destruction and foraging were a normal part of their duties.

Some soldiers agreed wholeheartedly with the hard war policy.  Even so, they believed only those who deserved it should be affected and "only in rough proportion to the extent of their sins" (Grimsley 185).  Others felt disturbed by it.  One soldier wrote home to his wife saying that while the strategy was effective at weakening the enemy, he could not "but feel a kind of a sense of injustice connected with it" (Grimsley 158).  Some soldiers believed it turned Southern civilians into enemies.

Grant aimed for a two-pronged strategy - one of annihilating Lee's army, the other, destruction of the Southern resources.  Grant saw the destruction as nothing more than a military necessity, albeit an unfortunate one.  According to Grimsley: "Grant, although willing to inflict destruction on a large scale if necessary to defeat the enemy, was far from embracing a policy of indiscriminate devastation" (Grimsley 162).

According to Grimsley, hard war was key in defeating the Confederacy:

"By destroying railroads they had crippled the South's ability to transfer men and supplies from one theater to another.  By eliminating arsenals, foundries, lead mines, and other factories they had ended the South's ability to create the sinews of war.  And by taking livestock and burning or despoiling they had done great temporary harm to the South's ability to feed itself" (Grimsley 203).

He asserts that more important than all of this was the blows dealt to Southern morale.  They no longer had confidence they could keep up the fight and win their independence.  Grimsley argues that even after years of warfare, most soldiers "still maintained a basic morality" (Grimsley 185) which differs from wars in history that are considered "total wars."  This morality did not stop destruction, but "it channeled it in some directions and away from others" (Grimsley 185).  Hard war damaged much Southern property, but restraint was also exercised.

The Hard Hand of War, Chapters 1-6

Looting in Fredericksburg, VA

According to Mark Grimesly, author of The Hard Hand of War, the Civil War marked a progression in the hardness of the North's policy toward the Confederacy.  The Union began the war attempting to remain as gentle with the citizens of the Confederacy as possible.  As time went on, Grimesly argues, guerrilla warfare in the South, the defeat of Union troops in battles, and the lack of the previously assumed Unionist sentiment in the South drove the Union commanders, with the blessing of Lincoln, to enact harder policy in dealing with the Confederacy.  Although the policy became more severe, the way the Union dealt with civilians in the South "was seldom the wanton, wholesale fury of legend," although that did sometimes take place (Grimesley 2).

The North started the war with a strategy that attempted to exempt Southern civilians from the troubles of war.  The Lincoln administration assumed that most Southerners were not for secession.  When the strategy of the North shifted to a harder war, the goal was still not to completely destroy the South, but to do whatever it took to win the war.  Between these two phases was a pragmatic phase that was less strategic than the other two.  Strategy was left much up to individual Union generals.

It was widely believed by the North, including Lincoln, that the South had been led astray by a wealthy and powerful few, and most of those in the Confederacy remained loyal to the Union.  If this was the case, it seemed counterproductive to enter the South with guns blazing, wreaking havoc.  The assumption that most Southerners were lukewarm was a misconception.  Still, the Union used a policy of conciliation with Confederate civilians for the first part of the war.  With this policy, the Union hoped to end the conflict without producing an excess of bitterness in the South.  As the war raged on, the North had to reconsider this policy.

Both Winfield Scott and George B. McClellan shared a desire for conciliatory policy.  Scott was known for his diplomacy and restraint and it had served him well in the past.  Scott hoped to avoid attack and bloodshed.  Many in the North quickly grew tired of the delay.  Lincoln decided offensive action should be taken.  Unfortunately for the Union, McDowell's forces were beaten at Manassas Junction.  In light of this, Lincoln called on George McClellan who had similar views as Scott but acknowledged that the North needed to take action and could not afford to wait.  He hoped to crush the Confederacy in one campaign as to not strengthen the will of the rebels.  McClellan succeeded Scott as General-in-Chief.

The initial policy of conciliation faced two main challenges  One was the existence of a competing policy in Missouri.  The other challenge was between the generals and the soldiers.  Not everyone shared Scott and McClellan's desire for a conciliatory policy.  Even though Missouri remained with the Union throughout the war, it was often treated like enemy territory.  Conciliation was attempted there and quickly abandoned.  The individuals responsible for this change in policy were Nathaniel Lyon and Francis P. Blair, Jr.  They remained concerned with the state of Missouri's loyalty.  They held civilians responsible for guerrilla warfare, which continued in Missouri until the end of the war.

Most Union soldiers found the conciliatory policy hard to swallow.  Conciliation partially failed because of the reluctance of the average soldier to embrace it.  Some opposed it out of principle and others believed it was not practical.  Soldiers often look apart fences for lumber, forced the local population to feed them, killed and ate their animals, and stayed in their homes without permission.  These sort of events did little to harm the Confederate economy, but they made the conciliation policy less affective and harder to maintain.

During the first Union occupations of the South, they attempted to keep violence on the battlefield exclusively.  In the west, the policy tended to be different.  Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant saw the conciliatory policy to be ineffective.  He believed the population in Missouri especially were not responding well to the policy.  Major General Henry W. Halleck found the same to be true.  Missouri is where a new pragmatic policy likely began.  This policy tried to keep the civilians on the sidelines as much as possible.  Adherents to this policy supported Unionists and actively punished secessionists.  Those who supported the Confederacy could expect to have their property taken.  The policy was carried into Tennessee and Mississippi.  Major General Benjamin F. Butler maintained a similar policy.  He also preferred to make dramatic examples of some citizens to demonstrate that they were determined to maintain order.  The policy of conciliation was used more often and was more effective int he east.  In early 1862, the policy of conciliation seemed to be working wherever it was used.

Everyone's focus shifted to McClellan's campaign against Richmond.  McClellan was not successful and one of the first things to suffer was the conciliatory policy.  Many from the North understood that they were fighting to bring the Union back together and one thing that would help is to avoid any unwanted bitterness on the rebel's side.  Still, some of the violence they were witnessing and experiencing from the Confederacy caused the Northerners to want to respond in violence.  Many Northerners gave up the hope they had held that their may have been Union sentiment in the South.  By the end of Summer 1862, it had been almost completely abandoned.  The Confiscation Act helped to end it.

Major General John Pope exemplified this abandon of conciliation policy.  He issued orders holding civilians responsible for damaged railroad lines and shots taken at Union soldiers.  The orders allowed for people suspected of those kinds of activities to be shot without trial.  Anyone was considered to be disloyal to the Union in the North were forced to go South.  Lincoln supported this harder policy toward the Confederacy.  Much of the population of the North seemed to rejoice in the idea of harder war, although many were not ready to see it be put into practice yet.  They were not ready to see Union troops act in complete disregard for the property and rights of the Southern civilians.  McClellan was not impressed by the new orders and was determined to continue with the policy of conciliation.

In reality, at this point, the orders were more used to scare Confederate civilians.  No one was actually shot or arrested because of the orders.  The orders did bring a swell of raiding.  In response, Pope issued a directive to clear up any confusion or exploitation regarding the order.

Soon after, Robert E. Lee made his way into Maryland in hopes of obtaining them as an ally.  McClellan's army was able to force them to retreat back to Virginia.  Lincoln took this as enough of a victory to issue his Emancipation Proclamation.  The Proclamation officially ended whatever was left of the policy of conciliation.  It also incensed the Confederacy and increased their will to fight.

Grimsley argues that the main reason the policy of conciliation was abandoned is the Union loss on the Peninsula campaign.  Many feared the war would go on indefinitely if a change in policy was not made.  The defeat was used as an excuse to expand the war's goals by Radicals.  It also "proved right" those who did not support the policy of conciliation in the first place.

Although conciliation had been abandoned, commanders did not immediately adopt a hard war policy.  Most still wanted their troops to have a sense of order and honor.  For practical reasons, it was important for the troops going through the countryside not to bleed it dry in a disorganized fashion.  This would negatively affect any troops coming after them.  It was also important for most manpower not to be used in foraging, but on the battlefield.

A pragmatic policy began to be embraced.  The extent of the harness of the policy depended on the cooperation of civilians in the area and the discretion of the individual commanders.  Generals had different ideas about when and how much foraging was appropriate.  Generals in the West were quicker than those in the East to adopt policies of authorized foraging.  In both the East and West, known secessionists were typically held responsible for the guerrilla warfare.  The purpose of pragmatic policy was not to devastate the south, but to control civilians so war could be waged on the battlefield.  It made the South a more definite enemy and set the stage for a harder policy.

Emancipation affected the South, and the United States as a whole, far greater than foraging or pillaging.  Emancipation was a military strategy, but it was also political and moral.  The Confederacy certainly had a military advantage in their slaves.  Some slaves worked directly for the war effort.  Others made it possible for more white men to fight by keeping the economy running.  If slaves were emancipated, they could be used in the war effort on the side of the Union.  This was one of the most important parts of Lincoln's Proclamation.

More than a military strategy, it was Lincoln's personal views and the strength of the anti-slavery movement that also was a driving force of emancipation.  As much as the emancipation was a military strategy, it was also a symbol of Northern resolve.  The Union would do whatever it took to eliminate the rebellion and bring the rebel states back into the Union.