The Hard Hand of War, Chapters 7-9

Burning of Atlanta

The policy of the United States toward the Confederate States of America during the Civil War moved from one of conciliation to pragmatism to hard war.  Conciliation made sense at the beginning of the war, but had to be abandoned.  Up to a certain point, it had worked.  The message of conciliation was not being understood clearly by the Confederates, partially due to certain contradictions, which caused the strategy to have to be abandoned.  Mark Grimsley, author of The Hard Hand of War, argues that "it is unlikely that the Southern people ever really understood the message of forbearance that Lincoln and other Northern moderates were trying to communicate" (Grimsley 211).  The war had already been destructive, but generally prior to the introduction of this new policy, war was not waged against civilians.  The Emancipation Proclamation officially brought about the hard war policy and Grant's ascension to command firmly established it.  The year 1863 marked the turning point in policy and the start of destruction at a wider scale.

Hard war had already been flirted with by other generals of the United States.  Grimsley claims that this was not hard war, but "a rigorous application of the pragmatic policy" (Grimsley 143).  Destruction of private property was usually in response to guerrilla warfare.  Other times it was pure vandalism, like the burning of private residences for no reason.  In Jackson, Mississippi, Major Thomas T. Taylor wrote that "the army acted more as a mob, than as disciplined soldiers" (Grimsley 161).  Destruction of railroads was considered legitimate by both sides.

Although hard war became the general policy by 1863, the severity varied from general to general.  Some generals carried out the policy indiscriminately.  Others disliked the hard war policy entirely.  Major General Henry W. Halleck was in favor in dealing with the South more harshly.  General Order No. 100 asserted "Sharp wars are brief" (Grimsley 149).  General William Tecumseh Sherman was never completely comfortable with the hard war policy.  Grimsley contends that "[i]t bothered him that soldiers would not confine themselves simply to authorized destruction" (Grimsley 193).

Most generals agreed that the hard war policy should be used with "appropriate discrimination" (Grimsley 180).  For the most part, property of those who supported the Confederacy was all that was targeted.  Few generals allowed for "wanton devastation" (Grimsley 150).  Sherman stated regarding the evacuation of Atlanta: "We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your lands, or anything you have, but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States.  That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it" (Grimsley 188).  Generals understood that anything that made peace more difficult after the war was over would be counterproductive and wrong.  Sherman asserted during the Savannah Campaign that commanders should "order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility" (Grimsley 175).

War-related factories and mills were often among the buildings destroyed.  Buildings that could be used in any way in the war effort were also often burned.  Not only did Union soldiers use Confederate crops and livestock to survive, they would destroy what they could not use in an attempt to cripple the Confederate army, guerrillas, and supporters.  Sherman reported on July 14, 1863, to Grant: "We are absolutely stripping the country of corn, hogs, sheep, poultry, everything, and the new-growing corn is being thrown open as pasture fields or hauled for the use of our animals" (Grimsley 159).  This devastation was practical, but also psychological, attempting a blow to the Confederate civilians and soldiers morale.

Soldiers were not allowed to enter private homes without permission or destroy anything that was not considered military necessity.  Theft was also greatly frowned upon.  General David Hunter witnessed soldiers breaking into homes and taking "dresses, ornaments, books, [and] money" (Grimsley 178).  He was furious at this scene.  Union soldiers became conditioned to the level of destruction with Grant in Mississippi.  It was hard enough to keep soldiers from vandalizing and stealing prior to the introduction of hard war policy.  It became more difficult after destruction and foraging were a normal part of their duties.

Some soldiers agreed wholeheartedly with the hard war policy.  Even so, they believed only those who deserved it should be affected and "only in rough proportion to the extent of their sins" (Grimsley 185).  Others felt disturbed by it.  One soldier wrote home to his wife saying that while the strategy was effective at weakening the enemy, he could not "but feel a kind of a sense of injustice connected with it" (Grimsley 158).  Some soldiers believed it turned Southern civilians into enemies.

Grant aimed for a two-pronged strategy - one of annihilating Lee's army, the other, destruction of the Southern resources.  Grant saw the destruction as nothing more than a military necessity, albeit an unfortunate one.  According to Grimsley: "Grant, although willing to inflict destruction on a large scale if necessary to defeat the enemy, was far from embracing a policy of indiscriminate devastation" (Grimsley 162).

According to Grimsley, hard war was key in defeating the Confederacy:

"By destroying railroads they had crippled the South's ability to transfer men and supplies from one theater to another.  By eliminating arsenals, foundries, lead mines, and other factories they had ended the South's ability to create the sinews of war.  And by taking livestock and burning or despoiling they had done great temporary harm to the South's ability to feed itself" (Grimsley 203).

He asserts that more important than all of this was the blows dealt to Southern morale.  They no longer had confidence they could keep up the fight and win their independence.  Grimsley argues that even after years of warfare, most soldiers "still maintained a basic morality" (Grimsley 185) which differs from wars in history that are considered "total wars."  This morality did not stop destruction, but "it channeled it in some directions and away from others" (Grimsley 185).  Hard war damaged much Southern property, but restraint was also exercised.

This Fiery Trial, VI-VII

In the beginning of Lincoln's speeches and writings, he was weary to add emancipation to the Union's war aims and to use black soldiers in the war effort.  As the Civil War raged on, his views evolved significantly.  They changed so considerably that, by the end of the war, he was boldly calling for permanant emancipation, an anti-slavery amendment, and limited suffrage for African Americans.

Lincoln faced criticism regarding his emancipation proclamation and use of African Americans as soldiers.  He stood by these decisions.  He used the examples of Maryland and Missouri to explain how much opinion regarding emancipation had changed: "Maryland, and Missouri, neither of which three years ago would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2541-2542).  He argued that he had done nothing more than what the Constitution allowed him to do and reiterated that the proclamation was a war strategy to hurt the Confederacy.  He heralded the use of former slaves in the war effort as a huge success.  African Americans could "bear arms in the ranks; thus giving the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2543-2544).  He went on to say that the new recruits had been tested and proven themselves to be good soldiers.

In regards to reconstruction, Lincoln made it clear that the emancipation of African Americans would stand.  Having slaves serve as soldiers by promising them their freedom, then taking that away, would "be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2564).  Lincoln was willing to look forward and not backward regarding the rebel states.  He was willing to grant "a full pardon... to them and each of them, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves" as long as they were willing to take an oath of allegiance to the United States (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2600-2601).  Lincoln, unlike some members of Congress, believed the oath should be reasonable as to encourage people to take it.  In Lincoln's prescribed oath, the former rebels must "faithfully support, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the union of the States thereunder; and... abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress [and the President] passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2604-2605).  Lincoln wanted to require one-tenth of all people in a state to take the oath before a state government could be reestablished and would be protected and supported by the United States.  He agreed to be flexible in working with Congress on reconstruction.

Lincoln recommended limited black suffrage for those who had fought in the war and "the very intelligent" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2634).  Although this was his recommendation, he did not require it of the new state governments.  He also believed an anti-slavery amendment should be passed and "the sooner the better" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2867-2868).  When the amendment was passed he called it a "great moral victory" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2952).

Lincoln believed "If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2641).  Before the Civil War, he kept this as his personal belief, but did not push for or have plans to push for emancipation.  He did not believe at the start of the war that "domestic slavery would be much affected" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2673) or that colored troops would be used.  As the war went on and emancipation was adopted as a war strategy, Lincoln's views regarding the future of slavery morphed into more extreme and long-lasting plans.

Turned Inside Out: Reflection on Wilkeson

In the Introduction to Turned Inside Out: Recollections of a Private Soldier in the Army of the Potomac, James M. McPherson argues that "[t]he Civil War was the biggest and most fearful experience that any generation of Americans has known" (Wilkeson v) and that it changed society permanantly in both the North and the South.  The Civil War stole the lives of more than 620,000 soldiers.  He applauds Frank Wilkeson's memoir as one of the first and most accurate recorded by a private soldier.  Wilkeson focused on the reality of the war, with its good and bad moments, and for the most part chose not to exaggerate in his descriptions of either.  McPherson remarks that Wilkeson sometimes "leans too far to the dark and ugly side, producing distortions of his own" (Wilkeson viii), but his memoir if by far one of the most reliable.

In 1863, Wilkeson joined the army at fifteen years old.  He was one of the few to serve as a volunteer in the last two years of the war.  He served for seven weeks with the Army of the Potomac in a period of time with some of the most intense fighting of the war.  Wilkeson wrote his memoir for the purpose of describing the Civil War from the perspective of a private soldier.  The literary works about the war were largely written by generals before his.  In Wilkeson's opinion, these generals had reputations to repair and therefore their writings cannot fully be trusted.  He believed enlisted men could provide the most accurate descriptions of the war and encouraged others to write their own memoirs.

When Wilkeson enlisted, he was surprised at the way he was received.  Those in command treated him like he was a criminal.  This was largely because of the epidemic of bounty-jumpers that plagued the army in the last two years of the war.  Wilkeson looked down on these men calling them "murderers and thieves" (Wilkeson 3).  He mentions other cowards he comes across, including a man who shot his own foot to get out of fighting.  The surgeons were much less sympathetic to this wounded man then others who had truly been wounded in battle.  The young man unfortunately woke up from surgery and "found that his leg was off" (Wilkeson 150), which was certainly an unintended consequence to his cowardice.

Life as a soldier was often rewarding for Wilkeson but wrought with hardships.  Traveling initially to the front, Wilkeson remarked on the disorganization and chaos.  Men gambled, got drunk, and stole from other men.  At the start of the campaign, Wilkeson recalled advice he received from a more seasoned soldier.  The soldier told him to pack light, focusing on food and tobacco.  When they were marching, he was only to pick up extra food or tobacco, not clothing or blankets.  He also advised him to fill his canteen whenever possible and not to straggle.  The Union soldiers often did not get enough sleep and were hungry much of the time.  Wilkeson remembered "the lack of good food and loss of sleep told hard on me" (Wilkeson 147).  After the fighting, the men were reminded that this war was not an adventure or fun, but it was "a savage encounter with desperate adversaries, who dealt death and grievous wounds with impartial hands" (Wilkeson 86).  The fighting physically weakened them and "unstrung our nerves" (Wilkeson 97).  Dead soldiers were usually left on the battlefield and buried quickly after the fighting was over.

The title of the book references the pockets of the dead soldiers lying on the battlefield.  Their pockets were turned inside out as the living stole what was in the dead mens pockets along with their bags.  Wilkeson recalled: "The dead men lay where they fell.  Their haversacks and cartridges had been taken from their bodies.  The battle-field ghouls had rifled their pockets.  I saw no dead man that night whose pockets had not been turned inside out" (Wilkeson 67).  Wilkeson admitted to doing this himself at times as well as stealing from the living.  He confessed that once before going back into battle "I equipped myself with a plug of tobacco and two canteens filled with water - never mind where I got them" (Wilkeson 69).  Wilkeson acknowledged that he stole tobacco, haversacks, and at one point a "sheep, which I had met in a field near Bowling Green" (Wilkeson 142).  Wilkeson remembered that the troops, himself included, raided tobacco barns, killed sheep and chickens, and stole food from farmhouses.

The men seemed to be high in spirits when something worthwhile was coming up, like marching to a new location or a flank movement.  Monotony, drills, and endless fighting seemed to discourage them.  Wilkeson remembered "joyfully" packing up "[a]t once understanding that a flank movement was at hand" (Wilkeson 151).  When marching to The Battle of the Wilderness, Wilkeson remarked that there was "the sound of exultant cheering" (Wilkeson 43).  Wilkeson himself was eager to fight.  In the Battle of the Wilderness, his was the reserve artillery, but he was anxious to see the battle.  He goes to check it out, knowing how dangerous it is.  Eventually, he picks up a musket and starts fighting as if he were an infantryman.

Wilkeson was surprised how quickly news travelled through the army.  He recalled that men would wander around the camps at night, going from fire to fire, bringing and looking for news.  Wilkeson called them the "army news-gatherers" (Wilkeson 54).  Rumors spread wildly and were often correct.  Wilkeson mentioned hearing one rumor repeated over fifty times one night that Meade had advised Grant to retreat after the Battle of the Wilderness.  He also recalled hearing an exciting rumor that enemy plans and numbers were found in the coat of a dead Confederate soldier.  Most of the information the soldiers received was from "prisoners whom they captured, from fellow-soldiers serving in the calvary, from negroes, and above all from the 'news-gatherers' who walked the battle-lines in the night" (Wilkeson 108)

The soldiers also like to study maps, strategize, and guess what the next move was and whether it would be successful.  Wilkeson argued that the enlisted men were skilled and accurate in their military reasoning and they could usually accurately judge the state of the campaigns.  One night the men sat up for hours studying maps "earnestly endeavoring to fathom Grant's plans" (Wilkeson 100).

Grant's leadership was for the most part welcomed by the Army of the Potomac because the men believed he would be more aggressive than his predecessors.  Wilkeson remembered hearing one man assert that Grant "cannot be weaker or more inefficient than the generals who have wasted the lives of our comrades during the past three years" (Wilkeson 37).  When Grant came in command of the Army of the Potomac, the men were ready to be led to victory or defeat and most just wanted the war to end.  Grant brought more recruits and firmer regulation and discipline.  When the campaign began, men were high in spirits and ready to go.  The Army of the Potomac had "longed for a fighting general - one who would fight, and fight, and fight" (Wilkeson 88), and with Grant, they got one.

Wilkeson seemed to have animosity toward many of the generals.  He believed they were lazy and did not fight with their troops like they should.  He sometimes doubted their ability to accurately judge the state of a battle or campaign.  He mentioned being worried at times "that Grant would keep sending us to the slaughter" (Wilkeson 123).  He criticized the generals for procrastinating on flank movements.  He denounced Generals Winfield Scott Hancock and William F. Smith for "dawdling the night away" (Wilkeson 172) when sensitive information regarding Confederate positions had been found.  He also criticized the amount of Union generals who lost their lives, arguing if they were doing their jobs correctly more would have been lost.  Wilkeson explained "[w]e knew the fighting generals and we respected them, and we knew the cowards and despised them" (Wilkeson 185).  The lack of fighting on the part of the generals, Wilkeson argued, was one of the biggest demoralizers of the Army of the Potomac.

Wilkeson often noted the poverty he saw among the Confederate soldiers and that it was especially evident "by the clothing and equipment of her dead" (Wilkeson 125).  He was impressed that despite their poverty, they fought "like men of purely American blood"(Wilkeson 70).  This shows that while Wilkeson fought for the purpose of reunification, he admired the Confederate soldiers and still considered them brothers.  He described them as skilled fighters who could be "deadly accurate" (Wilkeson 71).  Wilkeson never expressed in his writings bitterness or hatred for the Confederacy or its citizens.  He often applauded their courage and competence.

Despite the animosity between the North and the South, Wilkeson described moments of kindness between the two sides.  Wounded men would help other wounded men, despite their allegiance, to safely.  Wilkeson illustrated a touching scene where two soldiers, one Union and the other Confederate, were "drinking in turn out of a Union canteen, as they lay behind a tree" (Wilkeson 73).  He also recalled honorable Confederate soldiers who in one instance "understood what was being done and ceased to shoot" (Wilkeson 138) when a Union soldier ran into the line of fire to rescue another wounded soldier.  Wilkeson described "an unwritten code of honor among the infantry that forbade the shooting of men while attending to the imperative calls of nature" (Wilkeson 121).  Wilkeson himself once shared food with lost Confederate soldiers in the woods.  These exceptions show the humanity soldiers still have when they are fighting one another.

Wilkeson argued that the Union made two large mistakes during the Civil War.  The first was calling for volunteers to fight.  He believed that a draft should have happened sooner.  That way, the end of the war would not have been so wrought with bounty-jumpers and cowards.  The second mistake he saw was in the appointment of generals.  He argued that appointing mainly West Point graduates was a mistake because they were never soldiers themselves and were not fit to command soldiers.  He further goes on to say that West Point should be shut down.  He placed the blame for the war being drawn out as long as it was firmly on the shoulders of those West Point generals.

The Hard Hand of War, Chapters 1-6

Looting in Fredericksburg, VA

According to Mark Grimesly, author of The Hard Hand of War, the Civil War marked a progression in the hardness of the North's policy toward the Confederacy.  The Union began the war attempting to remain as gentle with the citizens of the Confederacy as possible.  As time went on, Grimesly argues, guerrilla warfare in the South, the defeat of Union troops in battles, and the lack of the previously assumed Unionist sentiment in the South drove the Union commanders, with the blessing of Lincoln, to enact harder policy in dealing with the Confederacy.  Although the policy became more severe, the way the Union dealt with civilians in the South "was seldom the wanton, wholesale fury of legend," although that did sometimes take place (Grimesley 2).

The North started the war with a strategy that attempted to exempt Southern civilians from the troubles of war.  The Lincoln administration assumed that most Southerners were not for secession.  When the strategy of the North shifted to a harder war, the goal was still not to completely destroy the South, but to do whatever it took to win the war.  Between these two phases was a pragmatic phase that was less strategic than the other two.  Strategy was left much up to individual Union generals.

It was widely believed by the North, including Lincoln, that the South had been led astray by a wealthy and powerful few, and most of those in the Confederacy remained loyal to the Union.  If this was the case, it seemed counterproductive to enter the South with guns blazing, wreaking havoc.  The assumption that most Southerners were lukewarm was a misconception.  Still, the Union used a policy of conciliation with Confederate civilians for the first part of the war.  With this policy, the Union hoped to end the conflict without producing an excess of bitterness in the South.  As the war raged on, the North had to reconsider this policy.

Both Winfield Scott and George B. McClellan shared a desire for conciliatory policy.  Scott was known for his diplomacy and restraint and it had served him well in the past.  Scott hoped to avoid attack and bloodshed.  Many in the North quickly grew tired of the delay.  Lincoln decided offensive action should be taken.  Unfortunately for the Union, McDowell's forces were beaten at Manassas Junction.  In light of this, Lincoln called on George McClellan who had similar views as Scott but acknowledged that the North needed to take action and could not afford to wait.  He hoped to crush the Confederacy in one campaign as to not strengthen the will of the rebels.  McClellan succeeded Scott as General-in-Chief.

The initial policy of conciliation faced two main challenges  One was the existence of a competing policy in Missouri.  The other challenge was between the generals and the soldiers.  Not everyone shared Scott and McClellan's desire for a conciliatory policy.  Even though Missouri remained with the Union throughout the war, it was often treated like enemy territory.  Conciliation was attempted there and quickly abandoned.  The individuals responsible for this change in policy were Nathaniel Lyon and Francis P. Blair, Jr.  They remained concerned with the state of Missouri's loyalty.  They held civilians responsible for guerrilla warfare, which continued in Missouri until the end of the war.

Most Union soldiers found the conciliatory policy hard to swallow.  Conciliation partially failed because of the reluctance of the average soldier to embrace it.  Some opposed it out of principle and others believed it was not practical.  Soldiers often look apart fences for lumber, forced the local population to feed them, killed and ate their animals, and stayed in their homes without permission.  These sort of events did little to harm the Confederate economy, but they made the conciliation policy less affective and harder to maintain.

During the first Union occupations of the South, they attempted to keep violence on the battlefield exclusively.  In the west, the policy tended to be different.  Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant saw the conciliatory policy to be ineffective.  He believed the population in Missouri especially were not responding well to the policy.  Major General Henry W. Halleck found the same to be true.  Missouri is where a new pragmatic policy likely began.  This policy tried to keep the civilians on the sidelines as much as possible.  Adherents to this policy supported Unionists and actively punished secessionists.  Those who supported the Confederacy could expect to have their property taken.  The policy was carried into Tennessee and Mississippi.  Major General Benjamin F. Butler maintained a similar policy.  He also preferred to make dramatic examples of some citizens to demonstrate that they were determined to maintain order.  The policy of conciliation was used more often and was more effective int he east.  In early 1862, the policy of conciliation seemed to be working wherever it was used.

Everyone's focus shifted to McClellan's campaign against Richmond.  McClellan was not successful and one of the first things to suffer was the conciliatory policy.  Many from the North understood that they were fighting to bring the Union back together and one thing that would help is to avoid any unwanted bitterness on the rebel's side.  Still, some of the violence they were witnessing and experiencing from the Confederacy caused the Northerners to want to respond in violence.  Many Northerners gave up the hope they had held that their may have been Union sentiment in the South.  By the end of Summer 1862, it had been almost completely abandoned.  The Confiscation Act helped to end it.

Major General John Pope exemplified this abandon of conciliation policy.  He issued orders holding civilians responsible for damaged railroad lines and shots taken at Union soldiers.  The orders allowed for people suspected of those kinds of activities to be shot without trial.  Anyone was considered to be disloyal to the Union in the North were forced to go South.  Lincoln supported this harder policy toward the Confederacy.  Much of the population of the North seemed to rejoice in the idea of harder war, although many were not ready to see it be put into practice yet.  They were not ready to see Union troops act in complete disregard for the property and rights of the Southern civilians.  McClellan was not impressed by the new orders and was determined to continue with the policy of conciliation.

In reality, at this point, the orders were more used to scare Confederate civilians.  No one was actually shot or arrested because of the orders.  The orders did bring a swell of raiding.  In response, Pope issued a directive to clear up any confusion or exploitation regarding the order.

Soon after, Robert E. Lee made his way into Maryland in hopes of obtaining them as an ally.  McClellan's army was able to force them to retreat back to Virginia.  Lincoln took this as enough of a victory to issue his Emancipation Proclamation.  The Proclamation officially ended whatever was left of the policy of conciliation.  It also incensed the Confederacy and increased their will to fight.

Grimsley argues that the main reason the policy of conciliation was abandoned is the Union loss on the Peninsula campaign.  Many feared the war would go on indefinitely if a change in policy was not made.  The defeat was used as an excuse to expand the war's goals by Radicals.  It also "proved right" those who did not support the policy of conciliation in the first place.

Although conciliation had been abandoned, commanders did not immediately adopt a hard war policy.  Most still wanted their troops to have a sense of order and honor.  For practical reasons, it was important for the troops going through the countryside not to bleed it dry in a disorganized fashion.  This would negatively affect any troops coming after them.  It was also important for most manpower not to be used in foraging, but on the battlefield.

A pragmatic policy began to be embraced.  The extent of the harness of the policy depended on the cooperation of civilians in the area and the discretion of the individual commanders.  Generals had different ideas about when and how much foraging was appropriate.  Generals in the West were quicker than those in the East to adopt policies of authorized foraging.  In both the East and West, known secessionists were typically held responsible for the guerrilla warfare.  The purpose of pragmatic policy was not to devastate the south, but to control civilians so war could be waged on the battlefield.  It made the South a more definite enemy and set the stage for a harder policy.

Emancipation affected the South, and the United States as a whole, far greater than foraging or pillaging.  Emancipation was a military strategy, but it was also political and moral.  The Confederacy certainly had a military advantage in their slaves.  Some slaves worked directly for the war effort.  Others made it possible for more white men to fight by keeping the economy running.  If slaves were emancipated, they could be used in the war effort on the side of the Union.  This was one of the most important parts of Lincoln's Proclamation.

More than a military strategy, it was Lincoln's personal views and the strength of the anti-slavery movement that also was a driving force of emancipation.  As much as the emancipation was a military strategy, it was also a symbol of Northern resolve.  The Union would do whatever it took to eliminate the rebellion and bring the rebel states back into the Union.

This Fiery Trial, IV-V

In March 1862, Lincoln wanted Congress to offer federal funds to any states that agreed to gradual emancipation.  He believed gradual emancipation would be best for everyone.  Congress did pass a resolution that would give states financial support if they would agree to gradual emancipation.  The state could use this money at its discretion for any inconveniences caused by emancipation.  In a speech to the border state representatives he predicted that if the border states adopted emancipation it would cause the Confederacy to "see, definitely and certainly, that, in no event, will the states you represent ever join their proposed Confederacy, and they can not, much longer maintain the contest" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 1741-1742).  He hoped this would bring the war to a quick end.  The border states rejected the proposal.

Lincoln knew he was not experienced in war strategy.  As his experience grew, his confidence in his strategies also grew.  Lincoln was also willing to admit when his strategies were wrong.  In a letter on July 13, 1863, to Ulysses S. Grant, Lincoln wrote: "I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right, and I was wrong" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2295-2296).

Lincoln and Union general, McClellan, often disagreed on war strategy.  McClellan sometimes ignored Lincoln’s orders.  McClellan was slow moving and defensive in strategy. He also reported that the number of men with him was lower than what he actually had with him and Lincoln called him out on it.  Lincoln tried to make him understand how important public opinion was and that the public demanded action. McClellan never learned this lesson until it was too late.  On April 9, 1862, in a letter to McClellan, Lincoln wrote: “once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow.” (Gienapp Kindle Locations 1695-1696)

McClellan often sent overly pessimistic reports to Lincoln.  Lincoln was typically able to remain level-headed in light of these reports.  After the Battle of Antietam, Lincoln wanted McClellan to pursue the Confederate army but McClellan moved so slowly that Lee and his army escaped.  McClellan was relieved of his position as commander for this reason.  For the rest of the war, Lincoln's primary strategy in Virginia was destroying Lee's army.

Lincoln wrote that he would be happy to receive the Confederate states back into the Union with full forgiveness, but he would not give them up.  His goal was "to save it the shortest way under the Constitution" (Gienapp Kindle Location 1871).  While some wanted Lincoln to focus on a goal of emancipation, he made it clear that his primary goal was bringing the Union back together.  In an August 1863 letter to newspaper editor Horace Greenly, Lincoln wrote: "If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 1874-1876).  Anything he did in regards to slavery, he did it wit the goal of reunification in mind.

In 1862, Lincoln was interested in African Americans started a colony somewhere else after they were liberated.  He believed that when slaves were granted their freedom they would be at a disadvantage to white men and it would be better for them to start over somewhere else.  African Americans were not interested in colonization.  Gradually, Lincoln gave this idea up.

A significant turning point in the Civil War was the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.  After the Union victory at Antietam, Lincoln issued the preliminary proclamation on September 22, 1862.  The seceded states were given 100 days to rejoin the Union.  Those who did not rejoin, the slaves in those areas still in rebellion would be "forever free" (Gienapp Kindle Location 1899).  Lincoln stated that "Without slavery the rebellion could never have existed; without slavery it could not continue" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2018).

Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863.  He was very confident that he was making the right decision.  He stood by his decision in a letter to a Union general: "After the commencement of hostilities I struggled nearly a year and a half to get along without touching the 'institution'; and when finally I conditionally determined to touch it, I gave a hundred days fair notice of my purpose, to all the States and people, within which time they could have turned it wholly aside, by simply again becoming good citizens of the United States" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2110-2112).

During the war, the Union responded aggressively to criticism of the war.  Lincoln made the following accusation: "he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a union soldier in battle" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2213).  On being criticized that his war policies were unconstitutional, Lincoln claimed "these provisions of the constitution have no application to the case we have in hand" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2190-2191).  He was happy to explain his reasoning behind war regulations regarding anti-war sentiment plainly.  He believed the safety of the Union required that habeas corpus be suspended and that the Constitution allowed for this in cases of rebellion.