This Fiery Trial, VI-VII

In the beginning of Lincoln's speeches and writings, he was weary to add emancipation to the Union's war aims and to use black soldiers in the war effort.  As the Civil War raged on, his views evolved significantly.  They changed so considerably that, by the end of the war, he was boldly calling for permanant emancipation, an anti-slavery amendment, and limited suffrage for African Americans.

Lincoln faced criticism regarding his emancipation proclamation and use of African Americans as soldiers.  He stood by these decisions.  He used the examples of Maryland and Missouri to explain how much opinion regarding emancipation had changed: "Maryland, and Missouri, neither of which three years ago would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2541-2542).  He argued that he had done nothing more than what the Constitution allowed him to do and reiterated that the proclamation was a war strategy to hurt the Confederacy.  He heralded the use of former slaves in the war effort as a huge success.  African Americans could "bear arms in the ranks; thus giving the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2543-2544).  He went on to say that the new recruits had been tested and proven themselves to be good soldiers.

In regards to reconstruction, Lincoln made it clear that the emancipation of African Americans would stand.  Having slaves serve as soldiers by promising them their freedom, then taking that away, would "be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2564).  Lincoln was willing to look forward and not backward regarding the rebel states.  He was willing to grant "a full pardon... to them and each of them, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves" as long as they were willing to take an oath of allegiance to the United States (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2600-2601).  Lincoln, unlike some members of Congress, believed the oath should be reasonable as to encourage people to take it.  In Lincoln's prescribed oath, the former rebels must "faithfully support, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the union of the States thereunder; and... abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress [and the President] passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2604-2605).  Lincoln wanted to require one-tenth of all people in a state to take the oath before a state government could be reestablished and would be protected and supported by the United States.  He agreed to be flexible in working with Congress on reconstruction.

Lincoln recommended limited black suffrage for those who had fought in the war and "the very intelligent" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2634).  Although this was his recommendation, he did not require it of the new state governments.  He also believed an anti-slavery amendment should be passed and "the sooner the better" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2867-2868).  When the amendment was passed he called it a "great moral victory" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2952).

Lincoln believed "If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2641).  Before the Civil War, he kept this as his personal belief, but did not push for or have plans to push for emancipation.  He did not believe at the start of the war that "domestic slavery would be much affected" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2673) or that colored troops would be used.  As the war went on and emancipation was adopted as a war strategy, Lincoln's views regarding the future of slavery morphed into more extreme and long-lasting plans.

The Hard Hand of War, Chapters 1-6

Looting in Fredericksburg, VA

According to Mark Grimesly, author of The Hard Hand of War, the Civil War marked a progression in the hardness of the North's policy toward the Confederacy.  The Union began the war attempting to remain as gentle with the citizens of the Confederacy as possible.  As time went on, Grimesly argues, guerrilla warfare in the South, the defeat of Union troops in battles, and the lack of the previously assumed Unionist sentiment in the South drove the Union commanders, with the blessing of Lincoln, to enact harder policy in dealing with the Confederacy.  Although the policy became more severe, the way the Union dealt with civilians in the South "was seldom the wanton, wholesale fury of legend," although that did sometimes take place (Grimesley 2).

The North started the war with a strategy that attempted to exempt Southern civilians from the troubles of war.  The Lincoln administration assumed that most Southerners were not for secession.  When the strategy of the North shifted to a harder war, the goal was still not to completely destroy the South, but to do whatever it took to win the war.  Between these two phases was a pragmatic phase that was less strategic than the other two.  Strategy was left much up to individual Union generals.

It was widely believed by the North, including Lincoln, that the South had been led astray by a wealthy and powerful few, and most of those in the Confederacy remained loyal to the Union.  If this was the case, it seemed counterproductive to enter the South with guns blazing, wreaking havoc.  The assumption that most Southerners were lukewarm was a misconception.  Still, the Union used a policy of conciliation with Confederate civilians for the first part of the war.  With this policy, the Union hoped to end the conflict without producing an excess of bitterness in the South.  As the war raged on, the North had to reconsider this policy.

Both Winfield Scott and George B. McClellan shared a desire for conciliatory policy.  Scott was known for his diplomacy and restraint and it had served him well in the past.  Scott hoped to avoid attack and bloodshed.  Many in the North quickly grew tired of the delay.  Lincoln decided offensive action should be taken.  Unfortunately for the Union, McDowell's forces were beaten at Manassas Junction.  In light of this, Lincoln called on George McClellan who had similar views as Scott but acknowledged that the North needed to take action and could not afford to wait.  He hoped to crush the Confederacy in one campaign as to not strengthen the will of the rebels.  McClellan succeeded Scott as General-in-Chief.

The initial policy of conciliation faced two main challenges  One was the existence of a competing policy in Missouri.  The other challenge was between the generals and the soldiers.  Not everyone shared Scott and McClellan's desire for a conciliatory policy.  Even though Missouri remained with the Union throughout the war, it was often treated like enemy territory.  Conciliation was attempted there and quickly abandoned.  The individuals responsible for this change in policy were Nathaniel Lyon and Francis P. Blair, Jr.  They remained concerned with the state of Missouri's loyalty.  They held civilians responsible for guerrilla warfare, which continued in Missouri until the end of the war.

Most Union soldiers found the conciliatory policy hard to swallow.  Conciliation partially failed because of the reluctance of the average soldier to embrace it.  Some opposed it out of principle and others believed it was not practical.  Soldiers often look apart fences for lumber, forced the local population to feed them, killed and ate their animals, and stayed in their homes without permission.  These sort of events did little to harm the Confederate economy, but they made the conciliation policy less affective and harder to maintain.

During the first Union occupations of the South, they attempted to keep violence on the battlefield exclusively.  In the west, the policy tended to be different.  Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant saw the conciliatory policy to be ineffective.  He believed the population in Missouri especially were not responding well to the policy.  Major General Henry W. Halleck found the same to be true.  Missouri is where a new pragmatic policy likely began.  This policy tried to keep the civilians on the sidelines as much as possible.  Adherents to this policy supported Unionists and actively punished secessionists.  Those who supported the Confederacy could expect to have their property taken.  The policy was carried into Tennessee and Mississippi.  Major General Benjamin F. Butler maintained a similar policy.  He also preferred to make dramatic examples of some citizens to demonstrate that they were determined to maintain order.  The policy of conciliation was used more often and was more effective int he east.  In early 1862, the policy of conciliation seemed to be working wherever it was used.

Everyone's focus shifted to McClellan's campaign against Richmond.  McClellan was not successful and one of the first things to suffer was the conciliatory policy.  Many from the North understood that they were fighting to bring the Union back together and one thing that would help is to avoid any unwanted bitterness on the rebel's side.  Still, some of the violence they were witnessing and experiencing from the Confederacy caused the Northerners to want to respond in violence.  Many Northerners gave up the hope they had held that their may have been Union sentiment in the South.  By the end of Summer 1862, it had been almost completely abandoned.  The Confiscation Act helped to end it.

Major General John Pope exemplified this abandon of conciliation policy.  He issued orders holding civilians responsible for damaged railroad lines and shots taken at Union soldiers.  The orders allowed for people suspected of those kinds of activities to be shot without trial.  Anyone was considered to be disloyal to the Union in the North were forced to go South.  Lincoln supported this harder policy toward the Confederacy.  Much of the population of the North seemed to rejoice in the idea of harder war, although many were not ready to see it be put into practice yet.  They were not ready to see Union troops act in complete disregard for the property and rights of the Southern civilians.  McClellan was not impressed by the new orders and was determined to continue with the policy of conciliation.

In reality, at this point, the orders were more used to scare Confederate civilians.  No one was actually shot or arrested because of the orders.  The orders did bring a swell of raiding.  In response, Pope issued a directive to clear up any confusion or exploitation regarding the order.

Soon after, Robert E. Lee made his way into Maryland in hopes of obtaining them as an ally.  McClellan's army was able to force them to retreat back to Virginia.  Lincoln took this as enough of a victory to issue his Emancipation Proclamation.  The Proclamation officially ended whatever was left of the policy of conciliation.  It also incensed the Confederacy and increased their will to fight.

Grimsley argues that the main reason the policy of conciliation was abandoned is the Union loss on the Peninsula campaign.  Many feared the war would go on indefinitely if a change in policy was not made.  The defeat was used as an excuse to expand the war's goals by Radicals.  It also "proved right" those who did not support the policy of conciliation in the first place.

Although conciliation had been abandoned, commanders did not immediately adopt a hard war policy.  Most still wanted their troops to have a sense of order and honor.  For practical reasons, it was important for the troops going through the countryside not to bleed it dry in a disorganized fashion.  This would negatively affect any troops coming after them.  It was also important for most manpower not to be used in foraging, but on the battlefield.

A pragmatic policy began to be embraced.  The extent of the harness of the policy depended on the cooperation of civilians in the area and the discretion of the individual commanders.  Generals had different ideas about when and how much foraging was appropriate.  Generals in the West were quicker than those in the East to adopt policies of authorized foraging.  In both the East and West, known secessionists were typically held responsible for the guerrilla warfare.  The purpose of pragmatic policy was not to devastate the south, but to control civilians so war could be waged on the battlefield.  It made the South a more definite enemy and set the stage for a harder policy.

Emancipation affected the South, and the United States as a whole, far greater than foraging or pillaging.  Emancipation was a military strategy, but it was also political and moral.  The Confederacy certainly had a military advantage in their slaves.  Some slaves worked directly for the war effort.  Others made it possible for more white men to fight by keeping the economy running.  If slaves were emancipated, they could be used in the war effort on the side of the Union.  This was one of the most important parts of Lincoln's Proclamation.

More than a military strategy, it was Lincoln's personal views and the strength of the anti-slavery movement that also was a driving force of emancipation.  As much as the emancipation was a military strategy, it was also a symbol of Northern resolve.  The Union would do whatever it took to eliminate the rebellion and bring the rebel states back into the Union.

This Fiery Trial, IV-V

In March 1862, Lincoln wanted Congress to offer federal funds to any states that agreed to gradual emancipation.  He believed gradual emancipation would be best for everyone.  Congress did pass a resolution that would give states financial support if they would agree to gradual emancipation.  The state could use this money at its discretion for any inconveniences caused by emancipation.  In a speech to the border state representatives he predicted that if the border states adopted emancipation it would cause the Confederacy to "see, definitely and certainly, that, in no event, will the states you represent ever join their proposed Confederacy, and they can not, much longer maintain the contest" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 1741-1742).  He hoped this would bring the war to a quick end.  The border states rejected the proposal.

Lincoln knew he was not experienced in war strategy.  As his experience grew, his confidence in his strategies also grew.  Lincoln was also willing to admit when his strategies were wrong.  In a letter on July 13, 1863, to Ulysses S. Grant, Lincoln wrote: "I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right, and I was wrong" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2295-2296).

Lincoln and Union general, McClellan, often disagreed on war strategy.  McClellan sometimes ignored Lincoln’s orders.  McClellan was slow moving and defensive in strategy. He also reported that the number of men with him was lower than what he actually had with him and Lincoln called him out on it.  Lincoln tried to make him understand how important public opinion was and that the public demanded action. McClellan never learned this lesson until it was too late.  On April 9, 1862, in a letter to McClellan, Lincoln wrote: “once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow.” (Gienapp Kindle Locations 1695-1696)

McClellan often sent overly pessimistic reports to Lincoln.  Lincoln was typically able to remain level-headed in light of these reports.  After the Battle of Antietam, Lincoln wanted McClellan to pursue the Confederate army but McClellan moved so slowly that Lee and his army escaped.  McClellan was relieved of his position as commander for this reason.  For the rest of the war, Lincoln's primary strategy in Virginia was destroying Lee's army.

Lincoln wrote that he would be happy to receive the Confederate states back into the Union with full forgiveness, but he would not give them up.  His goal was "to save it the shortest way under the Constitution" (Gienapp Kindle Location 1871).  While some wanted Lincoln to focus on a goal of emancipation, he made it clear that his primary goal was bringing the Union back together.  In an August 1863 letter to newspaper editor Horace Greenly, Lincoln wrote: "If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 1874-1876).  Anything he did in regards to slavery, he did it wit the goal of reunification in mind.

In 1862, Lincoln was interested in African Americans started a colony somewhere else after they were liberated.  He believed that when slaves were granted their freedom they would be at a disadvantage to white men and it would be better for them to start over somewhere else.  African Americans were not interested in colonization.  Gradually, Lincoln gave this idea up.

A significant turning point in the Civil War was the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.  After the Union victory at Antietam, Lincoln issued the preliminary proclamation on September 22, 1862.  The seceded states were given 100 days to rejoin the Union.  Those who did not rejoin, the slaves in those areas still in rebellion would be "forever free" (Gienapp Kindle Location 1899).  Lincoln stated that "Without slavery the rebellion could never have existed; without slavery it could not continue" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2018).

Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863.  He was very confident that he was making the right decision.  He stood by his decision in a letter to a Union general: "After the commencement of hostilities I struggled nearly a year and a half to get along without touching the 'institution'; and when finally I conditionally determined to touch it, I gave a hundred days fair notice of my purpose, to all the States and people, within which time they could have turned it wholly aside, by simply again becoming good citizens of the United States" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2110-2112).

During the war, the Union responded aggressively to criticism of the war.  Lincoln made the following accusation: "he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a union soldier in battle" (Gienapp Kindle Location 2213).  On being criticized that his war policies were unconstitutional, Lincoln claimed "these provisions of the constitution have no application to the case we have in hand" (Gienapp Kindle Locations 2190-2191).  He was happy to explain his reasoning behind war regulations regarding anti-war sentiment plainly.  He believed the safety of the Union required that habeas corpus be suspended and that the Constitution allowed for this in cases of rebellion.